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1.  Introduction  
Every school day, more than 30 million children in the United States receive free or reduced-price 
lunches through the National School Lunch Program (NSLP).1  With expenditures exceeding $9 billion in 
FY 2008, the NSLP is a large and important child nutrition program that is a vital component of the social 
safety net for low income children.  As such, policymakers expect the program to have a positive impact 
on the health of this vulnerable population.  Yet, the existing empirical literature reveals little supporting 
evidence and, in some cases, appears to find deleterious effects.  In particular, the literature has found that 
children receiving free or reduced price lunches are more likely to have negative health outcomes than 
observationally similar eligible nonparticipants.   
Despite these findings, the causal effects of the National School Lunch Program remain 
uncertain.  Assessing the effects of the program is made difficult by the presence of two fundamental 
identification problems.  First, self-selection of households into the program suggests that children 
receiving free or reduced price meals through the NSLP (hereafter referred to as free lunch recipients) are 
likely to differ from eligible nonparticipants in ways that are not observed in the data.  Second, the 
association between participation in the NSLP and poor nutritional health may be at least partly an artifact 
of household misreporting of participation in the program.  Meyer et al. (2009), for example, find 
evidence of aggregate NSLP underreporting rates of 45% in the Current Population Survey and 27% in 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  
While these identification problems have long been known to confound inferences on the impact 
of the free lunch program, credible solutions remain elusive.  Most studies treat selection as exogenous 
and, to our knowledge, all studies assume that the classification of receipt is accurately reported.2  
                                                     
1 The NSLP is based on three categories of payments: free, reduced price, and full price.  The former two categories 
apply for children with household incomes below 185% of the poverty line.  While those between 130% and 185% 
of the poverty line receive reduced price meals, the costs (no more than 40 cents per meal) are substantially less than 
the full price meals.  See http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/ for administrative details about the program. 
2 Recent studies that address the possibility of endogenous selection include Schanzenbach (2007) and Millimet et 
al. (2008).  Schanzenbach (2007) uses both a panel data design and a regression discontinuity design that exploits 
the income eligibility cutoff as an instrument.  Millimet et al. (2008) use panel designs, propensity score matching, 
and sensitivity testing methods to assess the impact of inferences to different selection assumptions.  Bhattacharya et 
al. (2006), who focus on the National School Breakfast Program (NSBP), use a difference-in-difference design that 
compares students’ nutrient intakes during the school year with their intakes during the summer when school is not 
in session.  They also compare outcomes of children attending schools that provide breakfast programs to outcomes 
of students enrolled in nonparticipating schools.  In general, these studies conclude that the NSBP improves 
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Addressing these identification problems using observational data is always difficult but especially so 
when the classical prescriptions are untenable.  State variation in program rules, which often serve as 
instruments to study the impact of other means-tested programs in the United States, are less useful as 
instrumental variables in this setting.  Most program rules are set by the federal government and, except 
for some of the nutritional guidelines, have not changed substantially over time.3  Moreover, as with 
much of the empirical literature on means-tested assistance programs, conventional parametric restrictions 
imposed to identify treatment effects – for example, the classical linear response model assumption – are 
difficult to justify when considering programs that are thought to have heterogeneous effects.  Finally, 
classical measurement error models do not apply when the inaccurately measured covariate is discrete 
(see, for example, Bollinger, 1996).   
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the free lunch program in light of the ambiguity created 
by the selection and measurement problems.  Extending a recent analysis of the Food Stamp Program in 
Kreider, Pepper, Gundersen, and Jolliffe (2009) (KPGJ hereafter), we apply partial identification 
bounding methods that allow one to consider weaker assumptions than required under conventional 
parametric approaches.  We use these methods coupled with data from the 2001-2004 waves of the 
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) to assess the impact of the free lunch 
program on the nutritional well-being of children. 
After describing the data in Section 2, we formally define the empirical questions and 
identification problems in Section 3.  The usual program evaluation literature formally acknowledges 
uncertainty associated with counterfactuals but not uncertainty associated with misreporting.  As a 
departure from this literature, we account for both identification problems in a single framework.  Given 
classification errors in the realized treatment variable, we extend Manski’s (1995) basic selection bounds 
using ideas for making inferences from corrupt samples from Horowitz and Manski (1995) and for 
addressing missing treatments from Molinari (forthcoming and 2008).  We also use related partial 
                                                                                                                                                                           
nutritional outcomes while the NSLP seems to increase obesity rates.  Evidence on selection is mixed.  See Currie 
(2003) and Millimet et al. (2008) for thorough overviews of the literature. 
3 Although program rules are set by the federal government, school districts have some flexibility in designing the 
meal plan.  
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identification work from Manski and Pepper (2000), Pepper (2000), Kreider and Pepper (2007 and 
forthcoming), Kreider and Hill (2008), and KPJG.   
After modifying the Manski selection bounds to account for classification error in the treatment, 
we introduce a number of monotonicity assumptions that help tighten inferences.  In Section 4, we 
consider the identifying power of a monotone instrumental variable (MIV) assumption that certain 
observed covariates are known to be monotonically related to the latent response variable (Manski and 
Pepper, 2000).  Requiring no a priori exclusion restriction, the MIV assumption can be plausible in many 
applications where the standard independence assumption is a matter of considerable controversy.  In our 
application, we maintain the relatively weak assumption that the latent probability of a poor health 
outcome is nonincreasing with income.   
In addition, we also consider two important variations of the MIV.  The first variation, introduced 
in Manski and Pepper (2000), replaces the exogenous treatment selection assumption implicitly imposed 
in much of the literature with a weaker monotone treatment selection (MTS) restriction.  This self-
selection model formalizes the commonplace explanation for why recipients have higher food insecurity 
and obesity rates than nonrecipients – namely, that the decision to participate in the NSLP is presumed to 
be (weakly) monotonically related to poor latent health outcomes.   
Our second variation introduces a new way to conceptualize the MIV assumption by using 
eligibility criteria as monotone instruments.  There is a long history of using ineligible respondents to 
identify the impact of a wide array public policies, including several recent studies that assess the impacts 
of the NSLP and National School Breakfast Program (NSBP). Schanzenbach (2007), for example, uses a 
regression discontinuity design that exploits the income eligibility cutoff as an instrument, and 
Bhattacharya et al. (2006) use children attending schools that do not offer meal programs.  While the 
basic idea of the discontinuity design is appealing, in practice there can be many limitations.  
Considerable disagreement often arises over the implicit assumption that ineligible respondents reveal the 
counterfactual outcome distribution for participants.  Moreover, even if the comparison group is credible, 
these designs generally only identify the effect for persons near the eligibility cutoff and are not robust to 
classification error.  
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In contrast, the MIV assumption allows us to relax this traditional identifying assumption by 
holding that mean outcomes among subgroups of ineligible respondents bound instead of identify the 
counterfactual outcome distribution.  In our application, we focus on three MIV ineligible subgroups: (1) 
children in households with incomes above the income eligibility threshold for free or reduced price 
lunches (185% of the federal poverty line), (2) children enrolled in schools that do not participate in the 
NSLP (primarily private schools), and (3) children who have dropped out of school.  Children in the first 
two groups are presumed to have no worse latent health outcomes on average than eligible children, while 
children in the third group are presumed to have no better outcomes on average.  Importantly, we show 
that this assumption provides substantial identifying information for the average treatment effect (ATE) 
even when there is classification error. Most notably, the latent outcome distribution under 
nonparticipation is point-identified for ineligible households since there is no selection or classification 
problem for this subgroup.  As a result, this eligibility MIV assumption has substantial identifying power 
in this application, reducing the width of the Manski worst-case bounds (Manski, 1995) on the average 
treatment effect for the food insecurity rate by nearly 70 percent.  Beyond the school lunch setting, the 
idea of using ineligible respondents as an MIV may prove to have wide applicability in the program 
evaluation literature. 
In Section 5, we consider the additional identifying power of a monotone treatment response 
(MTR) assumption that participation in the free lunch program would not increase the prevalence of poor 
health.  While free lunch recipients appear to be worse off than eligible recipients prior to accounting for 
selection, many have argued that the free lunch program cannot have negative casual impacts on food 
security or health (e.g., Currie, 2003).  Combined with our MIV assumptions, the MTR assumption 
narrows the range of uncertainty about the effects of the free lunch program.   
Section 6 draws conclusions.  In this application, we find that the three MIV assumptions applied 
to ineligible groups have substantial identifying power.  In particular, when we combine all three MIV 
assumptions, the estimated ATE bounds under the assumption of fully accurate reporting narrow to a few 
point range, and we can identify that the free lunch program has beneficial impacts on health-related 
outcomes.  Most notably, in contrast to the previous literature, we find evidence that the NSLP reduces 
obesity.  
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 2.  Data 
To study the impact of the NSLP on children’s nutritional health, we use data from the 2001-2004 
NHANES.4  The NHANES, conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease 
Control (NCHS/CDC), is a program of surveys designed to assess the health and nutritional status of 
adults and children in the United States through interviews and direct physical examinations.  The survey 
currently examines a national sample of about 5,000 persons each year, about half of whom are children.  
Vulnerable groups, including Hispanics and African Americans, are oversampled.  The NHANES 
provides detailed and varied information on dietary and health-related outcomes collected from self-
reports of health and nutritional well-being, medical and dental examinations, physiological 
measurements, and laboratory tests.  Given the wealth of health-related information, the NHANES has 
been widely used in previous research on health- and nutrition-related child outcomes (e.g. KPGJ, 2009).  
We restrict attention to households with children that are eligible to receive free or reduced price 
lunches through the NSLP.  Specifically, we restrict the analysis to children between the ages of eight and 
17 who are attending schools with lunch programs and residing in households with income less than 
185% of the federal poverty line.  This results in a sample of 2,219 eligible children.  We also utilize 
information from three groups of children who are ineligible to receive free or reduced price lunches: 
income eligible children in this age range who are not enrolled in schools with lunch programs (N=65), 
income eligible children who are no longer in school (N=107), and children residing in households with 
incomes between 185% and 300% of the poverty line (N=778).  
Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations for the variables used in the analysis for the 
entire sample of eligible children and by self-reported participation status.  For each observation, we 
observe a limited set of socioeconomic and demographic information, including age and the poverty 
income ratio (PIR), the ratio of a family’s income to the poverty threshold defined by the U.S. Census 
Bureau accounting for the family’s composition.  We also observe a self-reported (by the parent) indicator 
of participation in the NSLP and an indicator for whether the meals are free or reduced price.  In this 
                                                     
4 We pool the 2001-2002 and 2003-2004 two-year cycles of the NHANES.  Weights are established within the 
NHANES for use when multiple cycles are combined.   
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survey, 73% of the eligible households claim to have children who received free or reduce price lunches 
through the NSLP during the school year. 
We examine three outcomes: food insecurity, poor health, and obesity.5  In our data, 24.4 percent 
of the respondents are food insecure, 18.7 percent are obese, and 7.4 percent report being in poor or fair 
health. These three measures are considered to be central indicators of the nutritional health and well-
being of children and reflect a wide range of health related outcomes that might be impacted by the 
NSLP.  All three outcomes are known to be associated with a range of negative physical, psychological, 
and social consequences that have current and future implications for health.  Children in households 
suffering from food insecurity, for example, are more likely to have poor health, psychosocial problems, 
frequent stomachaches and headaches, increased odds of being hospitalized, greater propensities to have 
seen a psychologist, behavior problems, worse developmental outcomes, more chronic illnesses, less 
mental proficiency, and higher levels of iron deficiency with anemia (for a review, see Gundersen et al., 
2009).  Likewise, childhood obesity is known to have negative physical, psychological, and social 
consequences including reduced life expectancy (Fontaine et al., 2003).   
While policymakers have expressed a great deal of interest in understanding the impact of 
assistance programs on food insecurity, no one, to the best of our knowledge, has examined the impact of 
the free lunch program on food insecurity or measures of poor general health.6  There is, however, a 
growing body of literature that examines the program’s impact on obesity, a recent concern among 
policymakers.  This literature finds that the NSLP appears to lead to modest increases in obesity rates (see 
Millimet et al., 2008, and Schanzenbach, 2007).  
                                                     
5 To calculate official food insecurity rates in the U.S., defined over a 12 month period, a series of 18 questions 
about food-related needs and resources in the household are posed in the Core Food Security Module (CFSM) for 
families with children.  Examples include “I worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy 
more” (the least severe outcome) and “Did a child in the household ever not eat for a full day because you couldn't 
afford enough food?” A child is considered to reside in a food insecure household if the respondent answers 
affirmatively to three or more of these questions.  We measure obesity using measures based on a child’s body mass 
index (BMI, kg/m2) such that a child is classified as obese if his or her BMI is at or above the 95th percentile for age 
and gender.  General health is based on a self-reported measure provide by the child’s parent.  A child’s health under 
this measure is placed into one of five categories based on responses from the parent: excellent, very good, good, 
fair, or poor.  In this paper, we combine these general health categories into an indicator of fair or poor health.    
6 Food insecurity and self-reported measures of health have been widely used as outcomes in studies of other food 
assistance programs such as the Food Stamp Program (e.g., see Currie, 2003, for a review of the literature).  
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In Table 1, we see that free lunch recipients appear to be somewhat worse off than eligible 
nonparticipants.  Most striking are the results for food insecurity.  The rates of food insecurity among 
self-reported recipients are nearly twelve points higher than for nonparticipants.  The obesity rate is 
slightly higher for children in households claiming to participate, and the self-reported measures of poor 
health are nearly identical for recipients and nonrecipients.  For both obesity and poor health, these 
differences are not statistically significant. 
3. The Average Treatment Effect with Endogenous Selection and Classification Errors  
Our interest is in learning the average effect of the free lunch program among eligible 
households:  
               (1) ATE(1,0 | ) [ (1) | ] [ (0) | ]X E Y X E Y X∈Ω = ∈Ω − ∈Ω
 
where  denotes the health of a child if participating in the NSLP,  denotes the analogous 
outcome if not participating, and 
(1)Y (0)Y
X ∈Ω  denotes conditioning on observed covariates whose values lie in 
the set Ω .  Thus, the average treatment effect reveals how the mean outcome would differ if all eligible 
children would receive assistance versus the mean outcome if all eligible children would not receive 
assistance.  Conditioning on X allows the researcher to focus on specific subpopulations of interest.  In 
our analysis, we consider the full sample of NSLP-eligible households.7  To simplify exposition, in what 
follows we suppress the conditioning on X.   
 Two forms of uncertainty arise when assessing the impact of the free lunch program on children’s 
outcomes.  First, even if participation were observed, the outcome  is counterfactual for all children 
who did not receive assistance, and  is counterfactual for all children who did receive assistance.  
This is referred to as the selection problem.  Second, participation may not be accurately observed for all 
respondents.  This is referred to as the classification error problem. 
(1)Y
(0)Y
 In Section 3.1, we formalize the identification problems that arise from the selection and 
classification error problems.  Then, in Section 3.2 we focus on what can be inferred about the ATE in 
                                                     
7 Note that there are no regression orthogonality conditions to be satisfied, and excluding other personal 
characteristics does not introduce any omitted variable bias into the analysis.   
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light of the classification error problem alone.  In Section 3.3, we additionally consider the selection 
problem. 
 
3.1 The Identification Problem 
 To disentangle the selection and classification problems, it is useful to introduce notation for 
accurate and inaccurate reports of participation.  In particular, let * 1=S  indicate that the child actually 
participates in the program, with  otherwise, such that the observed health outcome is 
.  The classification error problem arises because we only observe  which 
indicates whether the household reports participating in the program, and not .   
* 0=S
*(1) (0)(1 )= + −Y Y S Y S* ,S
*S
 Focusing on binary outcomes, we can highlight these two identification problems by writing 
  
    
* * * *
*
1 1 1 0 1 0
[ (1) 1] [ (1) 1| 1] ( 1) [ (1) 1| 0] ( 0)
[ ( 1,  1) ]  [ (1) 1| 0] [ ( 0)  ( ) ( )]θ θ θ+ − + + − −
= = = = = + = = =
= = = − + + = = = + + − +
P Y P Y S P S P Y S P S
P Y S P Y S P S θ θ θ
*
      (2) 
 
where  denote the fraction of false positive 
and false negative classifications of free lunch participation, respectively, for children realizing a health 
outcome of i = 0 or 1.  Notice that the first term 
*( , 1, 0) and ( , 0, 1)θ θ+ −= = = = = = = =i iP Y i S S P Y i S S
* *[ (1) 1| 1] ( 1)= =P Y S P S =  is not identified because of 
the classification error problem.  If we rule out these errors such that 1 1 0,θ θ+ −= =  then  
is revealed by the data.  The second term is not identified because of both the selection and classification 
error problems.  The data cannot reveal the counterfactual outcome distribution, , 
regardless of whether participation is measured accurately, and, in the presence of classification errors, 
the sampling process does not reveal which respondents received assistance,   
*[ (1) 1,  1]= =P Y S
*[ (1) 1| 0]= =P Y S
*( ).P S
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3.2 Exogenous Selection Bounds 
To isolate the identification problem created by classification errors, we first focus on the 
important special case that arises when the selection process is exogenous:   
In this case, the average treatment effect is simply the difference in mean health outcomes: 
*[ ( ) 1| ] [ ( ) 1].= = =P Y t S P Y t
* *ATE(1,0) [ (1) | 1] [ (0) | 0].E Y S E Y S= = − =  
While Table 1 reveals the differences in mean outcomes based on self-reports of receipt, there is evidence 
that these reports are often misclassified.  In this case, the outcome probabilities are not identified.  To see 
this, it is helpful to write  
 
*
* * 1 1
*
1 0 1 0
( 1, 1)( 1, 1)[ (1) | 1] ( 1| 1) .
( 1) ( 1)
θ θ
θ θ θ θ
− +
− − + +
= = + −= == = = = = == = + + −
P Y SP Y SE Y S P Y S
P S P S −
,
 (3) 
 
Mean outcomes among participants, *( 1| 0)= =P Y S  can be decomposed in a similar fashion.  Since the 
probabilities, θ, are unknown, neither the numerator nor the denominator is identified and, in the absence 
of further assumptions, the data are uninformative.  However, using the basic conceptualization of corrupt 
sampling developed by Horowitz and Manski (1995), we have found that imposing weak restrictions on 
the pattern of classification errors can lead to informative bounds on the conditional probability in 
Equation (3).   
In particular, to address the classification error problem we maintain the following two 
assumptions:  
(A1) Upper Bound Error Rate Assumption:  *( ) λ≠ ≤P S S  
(A2) No False Positives Assumption:  If  1=S , then * 1=S . 
 
Assumption A1, which is maintained throughout our analysis, places an upper bound on the potential 
degree of data corruption.  We assess the sensitivity of inferences to NSLP participation errors by varying 
λ  between 0 and 0.25.  If λ = 0.1, for example, then up to 10% of households might misreport their NSLP 
participation status.  The existing literature evaluating the efficacy of the free lunch program has 
uniformly maintained the assumption of accurate reporting, thus implicitly setting λ = 0.  Assumption A2, 
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rules out false positive reports.  That is, respondents reporting to have received free or reduced price 
lunch are verified to provide accurate reports.   
The restrictions in (A1) and (A2) are generally consistent with the limited evidence on 
misreporting of free school lunch participation and the more detailed information on misreporting of 
participation in other assistance programs.  In particular, validation studies for other food assistance 
programs reveal negligible errors of commission (see Marquis and Moore, 1990, and Bollinger and 
David, 1997) and substantial error rates among households reporting to have not received assistance 
(Meyer et al., 2009).   
 These two assumptions imply informative restrictions on the unknown probabilities, θ.  From 
Assumption 1, we know for i = 0, 1 that 
  0 m  in[ ,  ( ,  0)]θ λ θ− −≤ ≤ = = ≡ UBi iP Y i S ,
,0 min[ ,  ( ,  1)]θ λ θ+ +≤ ≤ = = ≡ UBi iP Y i S   
and 1 0 1 0 .θ θ θ θ λ− − + ++ + + ≤      (4) 
Under Assumption 2, we know that  so that 001 == ++ θθ 0.θ + =UBi  
Thus, under Assumptions 1 and 2, it follows that (see Gundersen and Kreider, 2008, Prop. 1): 
* 1
UB
0 1
( 1, 1)( 1, 1) ( 1| 1)
( 1)  ( 1)
θ
θ θ
−
− −
= = += = ≤ = = ≤= + = +
UB
UB
P Y SP Y S P Y S
P S P S
  (5) 
and 
*1
1 0
( 1, 0) ( 1, 0)( 1| 0)
( 0) ( 0)
θ
θ θ
−
.− −
= = − = =≤ = = ≤= − = −
UB
UB UB
P Y Z P Y SP Y S
P S P Y
   (6) 
Kreider and Pepper (2007, Prop. 1) derive the analogous bounds under arbitrary errors for the case that 
Assumption 2 is not imposed.  
Given the results in Equations (5) and (6), a naïve bound on the difference in mean outcomes 
between recipients and nonrecipients can be found by subtracting the upper (lower) bound on 
 from the lower (upper) bound on *( 1| 0= =P Y S ) )*( 1| 1= =P Y S .  These naïve bounds on the ATE, 
however, do not account for the fact that the two conditional probabilities are linked by the unknown 
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probabilities, 1  and 0θ θ− − .  We compute sharp bounds on mean differences in health outcomes using 
numerical methods that impose these constraints (see Gundersen and Kreider, 2008). 
Figures 1A-1C trace out point-estimates of the bounds on the ATE for the three outcomes of 
interest as λ varies between 0 and 0.25.  The accompanying tables reproduce these results for selected 
values of λ (0, 0.05, 0.10, and 0.25) along with Imbens-Manski (2004) confidence intervals that cover the 
ATE with 90% probability.  For now, we focus on the case of exogenous selection.   
When λ = 0 such that reporting errors are ruled out by assumption, the ATE is point-identified as 
the self-reported gap (matching the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1).  For example, free lunch 
recipients are found to be significantly more likely to be food insecure.  Specifically, the difference in 
food insecurity rates between participants and nonparticipants is estimated to be 0.397 - 0.282 = 0.115 for 
households (Figure 1A).  Since the confidence intervals do not include 0, we can identify these ATE 
values as strictly positive even after accounting for sampling variability (again, consistent with Table 1).  
At λ = 0, free lunch participants are estimated to be in slightly better general health (Figure 1B) but also 
more likely to be obese (Figure 1C).  For both of these outcomes, however, the accompanying 90% 
confidence intervals include both positive and negative values.   
These figures reveal that small degrees of uncertainty about the reliability of NSLP classifications 
translate into large degrees of uncertainty about the ATE.  For each outcome, identification of the ATE 
deteriorates rapidly as λ departs from 0.  When λ = 0.10, for example, the estimated bounds on the food 
insecurity gap when imposing Assumption A1 but not A2 widen to [-0.177, 0.467], and the gaps for poor 
general health and obesity are estimated to lie within the wide ranges [-0.273, 0.110] and [-0.329, 0.258], 
respectively.
Thus, small degrees of potential classification error are sufficient to overturn conclusions from 
the data that free lunch recipients are more likely to be food insecure and obese than eligible 
nonrecipients.  In fact, if even 6.2 percent of participating households failed to report receiving benefits, 
we cannot identify that food insecurity is more prevalent among children receiving free lunches than in 
nonparticipating households (see Figure 1A).  For obesity, the analogous critical value for being unable to 
identify the sign of the ATE is only 2.8 percent.  That is, once we allow for NSLP classification errors, it 
is difficult to conclude that poor health outcomes are more prevalent among free lunch recipients than 
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among eligible nonrecipients.  Such conclusions would require a large degree of confidence in self-
reported free lunch participation status, an assumption not supported by validation studies.   
 
3.3 Relaxing the Exogeneity Assumption 
 In the absence of assumptions on the selection process, Manski (1995) shows that the bounds on 
the ATE given fully accurate data always have a width of 1 and always include 0.  That is, the data cannot 
reveal the sign of the treatment effect.  Adding ambiguity created by the reporting error problem will 
naturally widen these treatment effect bounds.  In this section, we show how the Manski worst-case 
selection bounds can be generalized to account for the possibility of classification errors (see KPGJ).  As 
above, we consider what can be learned under Assumptions A1 and A2.  
Consider the problem of drawing inferences on the probability of a negative health outcome if all 
eligible children were to receive free lunches, [ (1) 1].=P Y   As noted above, the fact that we cannot 
observe this latent outcome for children who did not receive assistance is the selection problem.  In 
particular, we cannot identify the latent outcome probability, *[ (1) 1| 0].= =P Y S   The fact that we may 
not observe which children received assistance is the classification error problem.  That is, we do not 
know the fraction of false positive and negative reports, θ.  
Still, we do know that  must lie within the unit interval, and Assumptions A1 
and A2 place restrictions on the form of the response error.  Thus, we can derive informative bounds on  
*[ (1) 1| 0]= =P Y S
[ (1) 1]=P Y  and   In particular, given Assumption 1 alone, we have  [ (0) 1].=P Y
 
1 0( 1,  1) [ (1) 1] ( 1,  1) ( 0) ,θ θ+ += = − ≤ = ≤ = = + = +UB UBP Y S P Y P Y S P S    (7) 
1 0( 1,  0) [ (0) 1] ( 1,  0) ( 1)θ θ− −= = − ≤ = ≤ = = + = +UB UBP Y S P Y P Y S P S .   (8) 
 
Returning to Figures 1A-1C, these worst-case selection bounds that allow for endogeneity (labeled 
endogenous selection bounds in the figures) can be compared with the exogenous selection bounds 
discussed in the previous section.  Clearly, much less can be known about the average treatment effects 
when the exogeneity assumption is relaxed.   
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For 0λ = , receipt of free lunches is known to be accurately reported.  In this case, the bounds in 
Equations (7) and (8) simplify to the well-known worst-case selection bounds reported in Manski (1995).  
Classification errors increase uncertainty about the ATE.  When λ rises from 0 to 0.1 under A1 and A2, 
for example, the ATE bounds on the food insecurity rate for households expand from [-0.518, 0.482], 
with a width of 1, to [-0.618, 0.557], with a width of 1.18.  Under A1 alone, the bounds widen further to 
[-0.718, 0.657], with a width of 1.38. 
Interestingly, under the no-false positive assumption, A2, the bounds on  in Equation 
(7) are identical to the worst-case bounds without reporting errors. 
[ (1) 1]=P Y
Even in this environment, however, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that the free lunch program has a large positive or negative effect on the 
likelihood of poor health.  To narrow these bounds, we consider a number of additional identifying 
assumptions in the next section.  
 
4.  Monotone Instrumental Variable Assumptions: Variations on a Theme 
 
Many observed variables are thought to be monotonically related to the latent health outcomes in 
Equation (1).  In this section, we formalize and assess the identifying power of several different types of 
monotone instrumental variable assumptions.  We begin by considering the seemingly innocuous 
assumption that the latent probability of negative health outcomes weakly decreases with income adjusted 
for family composition, as in KPGJ.  To formalize the notion that the latent probability of a negative 
health outcome  is known to vary monotonically with an observed covariate, let v be a 
monotone instrumental variable such that  
[ ( ) 1]=P Y t
 
 (A3) Income MIV 
1 2 2[ ( ) 1| ] [ ( ) 1| ] [ ( ) 1| ].u u u P Y t v u P Y t v u P Y t v u≤ ≤ ⇒ = = ≤ = = ≤ = = 1  
 
While these conditional probabilities are not identified, they can be bounded.  Let LB(u) and UB(u) be the 
known lower and upper bounds evaluated at v = u, respectively, given the available information.  Then 
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the monotone instrumental variable restriction (MIV) presented in Manski and Pepper (2000, Proposition 
1) implies: 
2 1
2 1sup ( ) [ ( ) 1| ] inf ( ) .≤ ≥
≤ = = ≤
u u u u
LB u P Y t v u UB u
In the absence of other information, this bound on [ ( ) 1| ]= =P Y t v u  is sharp.   
The MIV bound on the unconditional latent probability, [ ( ) 1]=P Y t  can then be obtained using 
the law of total probability.  If the latent probability is weakly decreasing with the MIV income, then  
{ }
12
2 1( ) sup ( ) [ ( ) 1] ( ) inf ( )≥≤
⎫⎧≡ = ≤ = ≤ = ≡⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑ ∑MIV MIVu uu uu uLB P v u LB u P Y t P v u UB u UB   (9) 
 
To estimate the MIV bounds on the rates of poor health, we take the appropriate weighted 
average of the plug-in estimators of lower and upper bounds across the different values of the 
instrument.8  As discussed in Manski and Pepper (2000; 2009) and Kreider and Pepper (2007), this MIV 
estimator is consistent but biased in finite samples.  We employ Kreider and Pepper’s (2007) modified 
MIV estimator that accounts for the finite sample bias using a nonparametric bootstrap correction method. 
In practice, the income MIV assumption has some identifying power but does not substantially 
narrow the worst case selection bounds in our application.  Thus, rather than present bounds under the 
income MIV assumption alone, we combine this assumption with two other distinct but related 
instrumental variable restrictions.  In Section 4.1, we introduce and assess the idea that eligibility criteria 
for the NSLP might be monotonically related to the latent outcomes.  For example, income ineligible 
children – i.e., children residing in households with income greater than 185% of the federal poverty line 
– are likely to have better average health outcomes the income eligible children.  In Section 4.2, we apply 
the monotone treatment selection assumption that participation in the program is (weakly) negatively 
related to expected health outcomes. 
 
                                                     
8 To estimate these income MIV bounds, we divide the sample into 10 PIR groups.   
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4.1 Ineligible Comparison Groups as an MIV 
 
Many program evaluations rely on ineligible respondents to reveal the counterfactual outcome 
distribution under nonparticipation.  This, for example, is the central idea of the regression discontinuity 
design.  Schanzenbach (2007) and Bhattacharya et al. (2006) use ineligible children to identify the impact 
of school meal programs on health.  
In our application, we observe three groups of ineligible respondents: income eligible children 
who have dropped out of school (v2 = dropped out), income eligible children attending schools without the 
NSLP (v2 = no lunch program), and children whose household income is between 185% and 300% of the 
poverty line (v2 = income ineligible).  Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations of the variables 
used in this analysis for these three ineligible groups of children as well as for the group of eligible 
children.  Children in schools without the NSLP are similar to eligible children, dropouts are much less 
likely to be obese but are more likely to be food insecure and in poor health, and income ineligible 
children are better off with respect to food insecurity and general health.  
These comparison groups are unlikely to satisfy the standard instrumental variable restriction that 
the latent health outcomes are mean independent of eligibility status.  However, the MIV assumption 
holding that mean response varies monotonically across these subgroups seems credible, especially for 
the food insecurity and poor health outcomes.  Children in households with incomes above the eligibility 
cutoff for the NSLP (i.e., above 185% of the poverty line), for example, are likely to have no worse 
average latent health outcomes than children below this line.  Likewise, children attending schools 
without the NSLP– which are primarily private schools – are thought to have better outcomes, and 
dropouts might be assumed to have relatively poor latent health outcomes.9  We apply these monotonicity 
restrictions to the food insecurity and poor health outcomes, but not obesity where the relationships 
between the three subgroups and latent measures of obesity are less certain.  
                                                     
9 The NSLP offers lunches in 99 percent of U.S. public schools and in 83 percent of private and public schools 
combined (USDA/ERS, 2004). 
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To formalize the notion that the latent probability of poor health, P[Y(t) =1], is known to be 
monotonically related to these observed ineligible subgroups, let v2 be the monotone instrumental variable 
such that  
 
(A4) Ineligible Comparison Group MIV 
   i.    2[ ( ) 1] [ ( ) 1| income ineligible],= ≥ = =P Y t P Y t v
   ii.   2[ ( ) 1] [ ( ) 1| no school lunch program],   and= ≥ = =P Y t P Y t v
   iii.   2[ ( ) 1] [ ( ) 1| dropped out].= ≤ = =P Y t P Y t v
 
For these ineligible subgroups defined by , we assume S2v
* = 0, and  there is no selection or classification 
error problem.10  The data identify 2[ (0) 1| ]=P Y v  but provide no information on   Thus, 
the monotone instrumental variable restriction (MIV) in Assumption 4 implies 
2[ (1) 1| ].=P Y v
 
{ }2 2max ( 1| income ineligible), ( 1| no school lunch program)P Y v P Y v= = = =  
 [ (0) 1]≤ = ≤P Y      (10) 
       2( 1| dropped out)P Y v .= =  
 
To estimate these MIV bounds on [ (0) 1]=P Y , we plug the observed sample probabilities into 
Equation (10).  For the food insecurity rate outcome, for example, [ (0) 1]=P Y  is constrained to lie within 
[0.361, 0.451].  Otherwise, in the absence of classification error [ (0) 1]=P Y  can lie anywhere within 
[0.075, 0.809], and these bounds will be still wider if we allow for reporting errors.  Thus, this MIV 
                                                     
10 The assumption that S*= 0 (similar to a sharp discontinuity design) may not be valid for the observed income 
threshold where income measures used to determine eligibility may reflect different time periods than measures 
collected in the NHANES.  A household whose eligibility was established in one period may have income that 
exceeds the threshold when the survey is conducted.  With a “fuzzy” threshold where S* = 1 for some “ineligible” 
respondents, the methods can be adapted to allow for selection and measurement error within “ineligible” 
subgroups.  In this case, the data would provide informative bounds on both latent outcome probabilities.   
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assumption has substantial identifying power in this application, reducing the width of the bounds under 
fully accurate reporting from 0.734 to 0.090.11  
Figures 2A-2C trace out sharp bounds on the ATE under the MIV assumptions and different 
degrees of misreporting.  For each outcome except obesity, we apply the joint income MIV (A3) and 
ineligible MIV (A4) assumptions.  For obesity, we only apply the income MIV Assumption (A3).  For 
ease of comparison, the “no MIV” bounds presented in these figures reproduce the endogenous selection 
bounds presented in Figures 1A-1C.   
The MIV assumptions, and especially the A4 restriction on ineligible respondents, substantially 
reduce the uncertainly created by the selection problem.  In the case with no classification errors (λ = 0), 
the width of the bounds on the ATE for household food insecurity declines from 1 to 0.261, a 74 percent 
reduction.  For the poor health rate, the width declines by about four-fifths from 1 to 0.207.  The 
estimated MIV bound of [-0.613, 0.164] for the ATE on the obesity rate, where Assumption 4 is not 
applied, has a width of 0.777.   
While these MIV assumptions have considerable identifying power, there remains much 
uncertainty.  Most notably, we cannot identify the sign of the treatment effect even if we rule out 
reporting errors.  These bounds highlight our inability to make strong inferences about the efficacy of the 
free lunch program without making stronger assumptions about unknown counterfactuals.  In the absence 
of further restrictions, the estimated bounds identified using the ineligible and income MIV assumptions 
alone cannot rule out the possibility that the NSLP has a large positive or negative effect on the likelihood 
of poor health outcomes.   
Moreover, the estimated bounds generally expand with the degree of potential misreporting.  For 
example, as λ increases from 0 to 0.10 under arbitrary patterns of misreporting, the estimated bounds on 
the ATE for household food insecurity expand from [-0.151, 0.110] to [-0.251, 0.210].  In contrast, under 
the no false positives assumption (A2), the bounds on food insecurity rates do not vary with λ.  Under this 
assumption, classification errors do not contaminate inference on either P[Y(1) =1] or P[Y(0) = 1 | v2].  
Thus, as long as Assumption A4 is binding, the bounds on the ATE will not be sensitive to classification 
                                                     
11 Notice that for obesity, Assumption 4 is rejected by the data: the estimated MIV lower bound of 0.190 exceeds the 
upper bound of 0.074.  As discussed above, we do not apply Assumption 4 to the obesity outcome. 
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error.  Notice that for obesity, where we do not apply Assumption A4, the bounds are sensitive to the 
upper bound misreporting rate, λ.  
 
4.2 Monotone Treatment Selection 
 Self-selection into the NSLP is the most common explanation for the positive correlation between 
participation and poor health.  Unobserved factors associated with poor health are thought to be positively 
associated with the decision to take-up the program, S*.  The monotone treatment selection (MTS) 
assumption, which replaces the strong exogenous selection assumption implicit in much of the literature, 
specifies that children receiving free lunches are likely to have worse latent health outcomes on average 
than nonparticipants: 
 
 (A5) Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS):   
    * * [ ( ) 1| 0] [ ( ) 1| 1] for 0, 1.= = ≤ = = =P Y t S P Y t S t
 
Under this MTS assumption, it follows that *[ (1) 1] [ (1) 1| 1]= ≤ = =P Y P Y S  and  
 (Manski and Pepper, 2000).  Notice that this assumption is a special case of the A3 MIV 
assumption discussed above.  
*[ (0) 1| 0]= =P Y S
[ (0) 1]≤ P Y =
 Figures 3A-3C trace out bounds on the ATE when combining the previous MIV assumptions 
with the MTS assumption.  For all three outcomes, the most striking finding is that the joint MIV-MTS 
model identifies the ATE as strictly negative and substantial as long as the degree of misreporting is 
small. If participation is accurately reported, these estimates suggest that free lunch program reduces food 
insecurity by at least 5.9 points (from 0.405 to 0.346), or 15%, poor health by at least 3.2 points (from 
0.108 to 0.072), or 33%, and obesity by at least 9.4 points (from 0.244 to 0.150), or 38%.   
While these findings seem to indicate that the NSLP plays an important role in improving 
children’s health, there are a number of reasons to temper conclusions based on this evidence.  First, 
identification of the sign of the ATE is precluded under even mall degrees of classification error.  Second, 
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even with fully accurate reporting, the 90 percent confidence intervals include zero.  Thus, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the program is ineffective in promoting healthy outcomes.   
Still, while these findings do not clearly identify the sign of the ATE, the ambiguity created by 
the selection and measurement problems is notably reduced under this joint MIV-MTS model.  Under low 
rates of misreporting, the ATE is estimated to lie within a few point range such that, at worst, the free 
lunch program appears to have negligible impacts on food insecurity, poor general health rates, and child 
obesity.  At best, the program may substantially reduce the prevalence of negative health outcomes 
including obesity.  This finding is in contrast to the previous literature that generally finds that the NSLP 
leads to modest increases in obesity.  
 
5.  Monotone Treatment Response  
The free lunch program seems likely to decrease food insecurity and poor health.  To formalize 
this idea, we consider the identifying power of the monotone treatment response (MTR) assumption 
introduced by Manski (1995 and 1997): 
 
 (A6) Monotone Treatment Response (MTR):  (0) (1).≥Y Y
 
The MTR assumption implies that the ATE must be nonnegative: the free lunch program, by assumption, 
cannot increase the probability of being food insecure or in poor health12    
 The validity of this assumption is likely to be sensitive to the particular outcome in question.  In 
particular, the MTR restriction seems innocuous when studying the impact of the NSLP on food security 
and general health.  As Currie (2003) suggests, it is difficult to imagine that providing a free lunch would 
                                                     
12 To see this, notice that observations where * ≠S t  may now be informative about the latent outcome of interest.  
For instance, children receiving assistance would have no better health outcomes if they had not received assistance.  
Thus, the observed outcome  provides a lower bound for the unobserved outcome .  Given this monotone 
treatment response (MTR) assumption, we know that 
(1)Y (0)Y
* *[ (0) 1 | 0] [ (1) 1| 0]= = ≥ = =P Y S P Y S  and 
.  Thus, * *[ (1) 1 | 1] [ (0) 1 | 1]= = ≤ = =P Y S P Y S [ (1) 1] ( 1)P Y P Y= ≤ =  and ( 1) [ (0) 1P Y P Y ]= ≤ =  (Manski, 1995; 
1997).   
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increase the prevalence of food insecurity.  In contrast, however, there is much debate about whether the 
NSLP might increase or decrease obesity.  Because NSLP administrators must adhere to nutritional 
guidelines, one might expect the free lunch program to reduce obesity.  Yet, the evidence provides a 
mixed picture suggesting that school lunches lead to some improved nutrient intake but also a higher 
portion of fat-related calories associated with obesity (see, e.g., Millimet et al., 2008).  Moreover, the 
receipt of free meals through the NSLP allows families to purchase more food, which in turn could 
contribute to obesity, but also better quality food, which might lead to reductions in obesity.  
 Both the MTS and MTR assumptions reduce the upper bound on  and the lower bound 
on   Thus, under the joint MTR-MTS assumption, we have 
[ (1) 1]=P Y
[ (0) 1].=P Y
     *[ (1) 1] min{ [ (1) 1| 1],  ( 1)}= ≤ = = =P Y P Y S P Y
and    *[ (0) 1] max{ [ (0) 1| 0],  ( 1)}.= ≥ = = =P Y P Y S P Y
Under this joint assumption, the upper bound on the ATE is nonpositive whereas the upper bound under 
the MTS assumption alone may be positive or negative.  The lower bound on the average treatment effect 
is unaffected by these assumptions.  
Figures 3A-3C trace out bounds on the ATE when combining the MIV assumptions with the 
MTS and MTR assumptions.   This MIV-MTS-MTR model allows us to identify the ATE for food 
insecurity as strictly negative across all degrees of potential misreporting.  For example, the estimated 
bounds on ATE for the food insecurity rates (Figure 3A) under arbitrary misreporting vary from the 8-
point range [-0.151, -0.076] when λ  = 0 to [-0.398, -0.076] when λ  = 0.25.  In the latter case, the lower 
bound improves to -0.151 under the no false positives restriction.  The ATE on the poor health probability 
(Figure 3B) is nearly point-identified in the absence of reporting error, lying in the range [-0.040, -0.032].  
The sign cannot be identified, however, after allowing for the possibility of small degrees of reporting 
error.  For obesity, where the eligibility criteria MIV assumption is not applied, much more uncertainty 
remains.  Still, we can identify a strictly beneficial effect of the program on child obesity under the MIV-
MTS-MTR assumption, even accounting for sampling variability, as long as the data are reported 
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accurately.  Under small degrees of misreporting, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no beneficial effects 
on child obesity.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
 
Children receiving free or reduced-price school lunches through the National School Lunch 
Program often have worse health outcomes on average than observationally similar children who do not 
participate, especially in the case of food insecurity.  Whether these puzzling correlations reflect causal 
impacts of the program has become a matter of considerable debate among researchers and policymakers.  
Much of the empirical literature maintains the untenable exogenous selection assumption, and the 
classification error problem appears to have been completely ignored.  Reviewing the general literature on 
the causal impacts of food assistance programs, Currie (2003) goes so far as to conclude that “many 
studies have … simply ‘punted’ on the issue of identification.”13   
Our analysis considered the impact of the National School Lunch Program on health-related 
outcomes using nonparametric methods that allow us to simultaneously account for the selection and 
misclassification problems in a single unifying framework.  The partial identification approach is well-
suited for this application where conventional methods of addressing these selection and measurement 
problems (e.g., standard instrumental variable methods) are often viewed as non-credible and there 
remains much uncertainty about even the qualitative impacts of the program.  By successively layering 
stronger identifying assumptions into the model, the approach makes transparent how assumptions on the 
selection and reporting error processes shape inferences about the causal impacts of the program.  
Our general approach involves replacing common identifying independence assumptions with 
weaker monotonicity assumptions.  In particular, we apply a series of monotone instrumental variables 
including the income MIV, used by KPGJ, and the MTS assumption suggested in the literature and 
                                                     
13 Bhattacharya et al. (2006), in studying the National School Breakfast Program, suggest that “no study has dealt 
convincingly with endogenous participation.”  
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formalized by Manski and Pepper (2000).  Similar to a regression discontinuity design, we also introduce 
a new way to conceptualize the MIV assumption using eligibility criteria as monotone instruments.  The 
eligibility MIV assumption has substantial identifying power in this application and may prove to have 
much wider applicability to other settings.  
Under these plausible monotonicity restrictions, the ambiguity reflected in the bounds is 
narrowed substantially and in some cases suggests that the free lunch program improves health.  For 
example, without classification errors, the joint MIV-MTS model reveals that the NSLP reduces poor 
health by at least 3.5 points, reduces food insecurity by at least 7.6 points, and reduces obesity by at least 
9.4 points.  These lower bound estimates are substantial.  For example, the estimated upper bound for 
obesity of -9.4 implies that the NSLP reduces obesity by at least 38 percent.  When we add in the MTR 
assumption, the estimated bounds narrow further and, except for the poor general health outcome, remain 
strictly negative even with substantial degrees of classification error.  While in many cases we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the NSLP has no impact of children’s health, the results imply that at worst the 
NSLP has little impact on health but may lead to substantial reductions in food insecurity, poor health, 
and obesity.  
A final contribution is our focus on outcomes besides obesity.  While obesity is clearly an 
important health outcome, the NSLP literature has paid little attention to food insecurity and self-reported 
measures of health.  In contrast, the literature assessing the efficacy of the Food Stamp Program (now 
known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)) has examined a wide range of 
outcomes, with a particular focus on food insecurity (e.g., DePolt et al., 2009; Gundersen and Kreider, 
2008; Gundersen and Oliveira, 2001).  In this application, we introduce powerful assumptions that can be 
applied credibly to the analysis of food insecurity and general health outcomes.  
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Table 1. Means by National School Lunch Program participation 
 
  Income eligible children† Recipients  Nonrecipients  
Age in years 12.0 11.6* 13.1 
 (0.087) (0.091) (0.194) 
    
Income to Poverty Ratio (PIR) 0.982 0.923* 1.144 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.028) 
    
NSLP recipient 0.734 1.000 0.000 
 (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Outcomes    
Food Insecure (Household) 0.366 0.397* 0.282 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.027) 
    
Obese (BMI ≥95th percentile) 0.187 0.194 0.168 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.022) 
    
      Poor or Fair Health 0.074 0.072 0.080 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) 
    
N 2219 1683 536 
Notes: Sample estimates weighted with the medical exam weight.  The estimated means for the NSLP recipient 
population are superscripted with * or ** to indicate that they are statistically significantly different from the means 
for the non-recipient population (with p-values less than 0.01 and 0.05, respectively, based on Wald statistics 
corrected for complex design). 
 
† Includes all children residing in households with income less than 185% of the poverty line and attending schools 
that offer a lunch provided by the National School Lunch Program.  
  
  
Table 2. Means by National School Lunch Program participation 
  Income Eligible 
Children Attending  
NSLP Schools†
Income Eligible 
Children Attending  
non-NSLP Schools†
Income 
Eligible 
Dropouts†
Income 
Ineligible+
Age in years 12.0 13.3* 15.1* 12.2 
 (0.087) (0.489) (0.350) (0.134) 
     
PIR 0.982 1.068** 1.003 2.421** 
 (0.015) (0.069) (0.060) (0.016) 
     
NSLP recipient 0.734 0.000 0.000 0.226** 
 (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) 
     
Outcomes     
Food insecure (household) 0.366 0.361 0.451 0.132** 
 (0.015) (0.088) (0.066) (0.016) 
     
Obese (BMI ≥95th percentile) 0.187 0.190 0.074* 0.186 
 (0.012) (0.072) (0.026) (0.019) 
     
        Poor or Fair Health 0.074 0.071 0.093 0.018** 
 (0.008) (0.058) (0.028) (0.005) 
     
N 2219 65 107 778 
Notes: Sample estimates weighted with the medical exam weight. The estimated means for Columns (2) through (4) 
are superscripted with * or ** to indicate that they are statistically significantly different from the means for the 
income eligible population in Column (1) with p-values less than 0.01 and 0.05, respectively (based on Wald 
statistics corrected for complex design). 
 
† Children residing in households with income less than 185 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL) are classified 
as income eligible, whereas those with income between 185-300% of the FPL are classified as ineligible. Among the 
income eligible households, some attend schools without the NSLP and some have dropped out of school.  
 
 
Figure 1A.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Household Food Insecurity: 
       Endogenous vs. Exogenous NSLP Participation†
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 λ 
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        Selected values of λ 
 
       Exogenous Selection       Endogenous Selection 
 
                   Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives       Arbitrary Errors     No False Positives
   λ=0          [ 0.115, 0.115]†        [ 0.115, 0.115]          [-0.518,  0.482]    [-0.518,  0.482] 
                 [ 0.061  0.169] ‡        [ 0.061  0.169]           [-0.538   0.503]    [-0.538   0.503]                     
        
λ=0.05   [-0.043, 0.320]         [ 0.025, 0.320]         [-0.618,  0.582]    [-0.568,  0.532]                 
       [-0.082  0.370]         [-0.024  0.370]          [-0.638   0.603]    [-0.588   0.553]              
 
λ=0.10        [-0.177, 0.467]         [-0.102, 0.452]          [-0.718,  0.657]    [-0.618,  0.557]       
[-0.219  0.489]         [-0.165  0.475]          [-0.738   0.677]    [-0.638   0.577]         
 
λ=0.25   [-0.915, 0.601]         [-0.685, 0.452]         [-0.959,  0.807]    [-0.709,  0.557]                
[-0.952  0.637]         [-0.705  0.475]          [-0.977   0.827]    [-0.727   0.577]      
 
 
    † Point estimates of the population bounds 
    ‡ 90% confidence intervals around ATE are calculated using methods from Imbens-Manski (2004) with 1,000 
pseudosamples  
  
Figure 1B.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Child Poor Health: 
       Endogenous vs. Exogenous NSLP Participation†
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0.002  
 
 
 
 
        Selected values of λ 
 
       Exogenous Selection       Endogenous Selection 
 
                   Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives       Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives
   λ=0          [-0.008, -0.008]†      [-0.008, -0.008]         [-0.703,  0.297]    [-0.703,  0.297] 
                 [-0.035   0.020] ‡      [-0.035   0.020]          [-0.722   0.317]    [-0.722   0.317]                     
        
λ=0.05   [-0.221,  0.102]        [-0.031,  0.098]         [-0.803,  0.369]    [-0.703,  0.297]                 
       [-0.242   0.116]        [-0.056   0.112]         [-0.821   0.388]    [-0.722   0.317]              
 
λ=0.10        [-0.273,  0.110]        [-0.064,  0.098]          [-0.855,  0.419]    [-0.803,  0.319]       
[-0.303   0.125]        [-0.097   0.112]         [-0.874   0.438]    [-0.822   0.338]         
 
λ=0.25   [-1.000,  0.141]        [-0.946,  0.098]          [-1.000,  0.569]    [-0.947,  0.319]                
[-1.000   0.160]        [-1.000   0.112]          [-1.000   0.588]    [-0.958   0.338]      
 
 
    † Point estimates of the population bounds 
    ‡ 90% confidence intervals around ATE are calculated using methods from Imbens-Manski (2004) with 1,000 
pseudosamples  
  
Figure 1C.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Child Obesity: 
       Endogenous vs. Exogenous NSLP Participation†
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        Selected values of λ 
 
       Exogenous Selection       Endogenous Selection 
 
                   Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives       Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives
   λ=0          [ 0.026,  0.026]†    [ 0.026,  0.026]          [-0.637,  0.363]    [-0.637,  0.363] 
                 [-0.018   0.069] ‡      [-0.018   0.069]            [-0.657   0.384]    [-0.657   0.384]                     
        
λ=0.05   [-0.165,  0.242]        [-0.025,  0.240]            [-0.737,  0.458]    [-0.687,  0.408]                 
       [-0.197   0.263]        [-0.065   0.261]           [-0.757   0.479]    [-0.707   0.429]              
 
λ=0.10        [-0.329,  0.258]        [-0.099,  0.240]            [-0.837,  0.508]    [-0.737,  0.408]       
[-0.361   0.279]        [-0.149   0.260]           [-0.857   0.529]    [-0.757   0.429]         
 
λ=0.25   [-1.000,  0.326]        [-0.851,  0.240]           [-1.000,  0.658]    [-0.858,  0.408]                
[-1.000   0.351]        [-0.874   0.260]           [-1.000   0.679]    [-0.872   0.429]      
 
 
    † Point estimates of the population bounds 
    ‡ 90% confidence intervals around ATE are calculated using methods from Imbens-Manski (2004) with 1,000 
pseudosamples  
  
  
Figure 2A.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Household Food Insecurity: 
       Endogenous NSLP Participation, with vs. without MIV†
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        Selected values of λ 
 
          No MIV          With MIV 
 
                   Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives       Arbitrary Errors     No False Positives
   λ=0          [-0.518,  0.482]†       [-0.518,  0.482]           [-0.151,  0.110]    [-0.151,  0.110] 
                 [-0.538   0.503] ‡      [-0.538   0.503]          [-0.250   0.260]    [-0.250   0.260]                     
        
λ=0.05   [-0.618,  0.582]    [-0.568,  0.532]           [-0.201,  0.160]    [-0.151,  0.110]                 
       [-0.638   0.603]    [-0.588   0.553]           [-0.300   0.311]    [-0.250   0.260]              
 
λ=0.10        [-0.718,  0.657]    [-0.618,  0.557]          [-0.251,  0.210]    [-0.151,  0.110]       
[-0.738   0.677]    [-0.638   0.577]           [-0.350   0.361]    [-0.250   0.260]         
 
λ=0.25   [-0.959,  0.807]    [-0.709,  0.557]          [-0.398,  0.359]    [-0.151,  0.110]                
[-0.977   0.827]    [-0.727   0.577]          [-0.498   0.510]    [-0.250   0.260]      
 
 
    † Point estimates of the population bounds 
    ‡ 90% confidence intervals around ATE are calculated using methods from Imbens-Manski (2004) with 1,000 
pseudosamples  
  
Figure 2B.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Child Poor Health: 
      Endogenous NSLP Participation, with vs. without MIV†
 
                      
ATE  arbitrary errors
 
 
no false positives 
no MIV 
0.297 
0.167 
with MIV 
-0.040 
no MIV 
-0.703 
 λ 
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        Selected values of λ 
 
          No MIV          With MIV 
 
                   Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives       Arbitrary Errors     No False Positives
  λ=0          [-0.703,  0.297]†      [-0.703,  0.297]         [-0.040,  0.167]    [-0.040,  0.167] 
                 [-0.722   0.317] ‡      [-0.722   0.317]          [-0.073   0.256]    [-0.073   0.256]                     
        
λ=0.05   [-0.803,  0.369]    [-0.703,  0.297]         [-0.090,  0.217]    [-0.040,  0.167]                 
       [-0.821   0.388]    [-0.722   0.317]         [-0.123   0.309]    [-0.073   0.256]              
 
λ=0.10        [-0.855,  0.419]    [-0.803,  0.319]         [-0.093,  0.417]    [-0.040,  0.167]      
[-0.874   0.438]    [-0.822   0.338]         [-0.125   0.509]    [-0.073   0.256]         
 
λ=0.25   [-1.000,  0.569]    [-0.947,  0.319]          [-0.093,  0.417]    [-0.040,  0.167]                
[-1.000   0.588]    [-0.958   0.338]          [-0.125   0.509]    [-0.073   0.256]       
 
 
    † Point estimates of the population bounds 
    ‡ 90% confidence intervals around ATE are calculated using methods from Imbens-Manski (2004) with 1,000 
pseudosamples  
 
  
Figure 2C.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Child Obesity: 
       Endogenous NSLP Participation, with vs. without MIV†
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        Selected values of λ 
 
          No MIV          With MIV*
 
                   Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives       Arbitrary Errors     No False Positives
  λ=0          [-0.637,  0.363]†    [-0.637,  0.363]          [-0.613,  0.164]    [-0.613,  0.164] 
                 [-0.657   0.384] ‡      [-0.657   0.384]            [-0.656   0.256]    [-0.656   0.256]                     
        
λ=0.05   [-0.737,  0.458]    [-0.687,  0.408]            [-0.713,  0.273]    [-0.663,  0.223]                 
       [-0.757   0.479]    [-0.707   0.429]           [-0.756   0.364]    [-0.706   0.314]              
 
λ=0.10        [-0.837,  0.508]    [-0.737,  0.408]            [-0.813,  0.354]    [-0.713,  0.254]       
[-0.857   0.529]    [-0.757   0.429]           [-0.856   0.436]    [-0.756   0.336]         
 
λ=0.25   [-1.000,  0.658]    [-0.858,  0.408]           [-1.000,  0.504]    [-0.846,  0.254]                
[-1.000   0.679]    [-0.872   0.429]           [-1.000   0.582]    [-0.871   0.332]     
 
 
    † Point estimates of the population bounds 
    ‡ 90% confidence intervals around ATE are calculated using methods from Imbens-Manski (2004) with 1,000 
pseudosamples  
*For the obesity outcome, only the income-to-poverty ratio MIV assumption is imposed; the MIV ineligibles assumptions 
are not imposed. 
  
  
Figure 3A.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Household Food Insecurity: 
       Endogenous NSLP Participation with MIV, MTS, and MTR†
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        Selected values of λ 
 
        MIV & MTS        MIV, MTS, & MTR 
 
                   Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives       Arbitrary Errors     No False Positives
   λ=0          [-0.151, -0.059]†      [-0.151, -0.059]           [-0.151, -0.076]    [-0.151, -0.076] 
                 [-0.250   0.060] ‡      [-0.250   0.060]          [-0.250   0.000]    [-0.250   0.000]                     
        
λ=0.05   [-0.201,  0.020]        [-0.151,  0.020]           [-0.201, -0.076]    [-0.151, -0.076]                 
       [-0.300   0.153]        [-0.250   0.153]           [-0.300   0.000]    [-0.250   0.000]              
 
λ=0.10        [-0.251,  0.044]        [-0.151,  0.031]          [-0.251, -0.076]    [-0.151, -0.076]       
[-0.350   0.184]        [-0.250   0.171]           [-0.350   0.000]    [-0.250   0.000]         
 
λ=0.25   [-0.398,  0.150]        [-0.151,  0.031]          [-0.398, -0.076]    [-0.151, -0.076]                
[-0.498   0.314]        [-0.250   0.173]          [-0.498   0.000]    [-0.250   0.000]      
 
 
    † Point estimates of the population bounds 
    ‡ 90% confidence intervals around ATE are calculated using methods from Imbens-Manski (2004) with 1,000 
pseudosamples  
  
Figure 3B.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Child Poor Health: 
      Endogenous NSLP Participation with MIV, MTS, and MTR†
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        Selected values of λ 
 
        MIV & MTS        MIV, MTS, & MTR 
 
                   Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives       Arbitrary Errors     No False Positives
   λ=0          [-0.040, -0.036]†      [-0.040, -0.036]          [-0.040, -0.036]    [-0.040, -0.036] 
                 [-0.075   0.039] ‡      [-0.075   0.039]           [-0.075   0.000]    [-0.075   0.000]                     
        
λ=0.05   [-0.090,  0.031]        [-0.040,  0.028]           [-0.090,  0.000]    [-0.040,  0.000]                 
       [-0.123   0.098]        [-0.074   0.095]           [-0.123   0.000]    [-0.074   0.000]              
 
λ=0.10        [-0.093,  0.039]        [-0.040,  0.028]          [-0.093,  0.000]    [-0.040,  0.000]       
[-0.125   0.105]        [-0.074   0.095]           [-0.125   0.000]    [-0.074   0.000]         
 
λ=0.25   [-0.093,  0.070]        [-0.040,  0.028]          [-0.093,  0.000]    [-0.040,  0.000]               
[-0.125   0.137]        [-0.074   0.095]          [-0.125   0.000]    [-0.074   0.000]      
 
 
    † Point estimates of the population bounds 
    ‡ 90% confidence intervals around ATE are calculated using methods from Imbens-Manski (2004) with 1,000 
pseudosamples  
 
  
Figure 3C.  Sharp Bounds on the ATE for Child Obesity: 
      Endogenous NSLP Participation with MIV, MTS, and MTR†
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        Selected values of λ 
 
        MIV* & MTS        MIV*, MTS, & MTR 
 
                   Arbitrary Errors    No False Positives       Arbitrary Errors     No False Positives
   λ=0          [-0.613, -0.094]†      [-0.613, -0.094]           [-0.613, -0.094]    [-0.613, -0.094] 
                 [-0.656   0.012] ‡      [-0.656   0.012]          [-0.656  -0.001]    [-0.656  -0.001]                    
        
λ=0.05   [-0.713,  0.111]        [-0.663,  0.105]           [-0.713, -0.047]   [-0.663, -0.047]                 
       [-0.756   0.217]        [-0.706   0.211]           [-0.756   0.000]    [-0.706   0.000]              
 
λ=0.10        [-0.813,  0.197]        [-0.713,  0.186]           [-0.813, -0.047]    [-0.713, -0.047]       
[-0.856   0.276]        [-0.756   0.258]          [-0.856   0.000]    [-0.756   0.000]         
 
λ=0.25   [-1.000,  0.241]        [-0.846,  0.186]            [-1.000, -0.047]    [-0.846, -0.047]                
[-1.000   0.329]        [-0.871   0.249]           [-1.000   0.000]    [-0.871   0.000]      
 
 
    † Point estimates of the population bounds 
    ‡ 90% confidence intervals around ATE are calculated using methods from Imbens-Manski (2004) with 1,000 
pseudosamples  
*For the obesity outcome, only the income-to-poverty ratio MIV assumption is imposed; the MIV ineligibles assumptions 
are not imposed. 
 
  
